

ALBERTA ENERGY AND UTILITIES BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF THE ENERGY RESOURCES
CONSERVATION ACT, Ch. E-10 OF THE REVISED
STATUTES OF ALBERTA 2000;

AND IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDING NO. 1457147
RESPECTING A REVIEW HEARING IN CONNECTION WITH
THE ISSUANCE OF CERTAIN WELL LICENCES, AND
COMPULSORY POOLING AND SPECIAL SPACING ORDERS
IN THE CLIVE, EWING LAKE, STETTLER AND WIMBORNE
FIELDS

PART 2

WRITTEN ARGUMENT OF DEVON CANADA CORPORATION

November 15, 2006

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I. OVERVIEW

1. Pursuant to an Amended Notice of Hearing dated July 27, 2006 the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (the "Board") held a public hearing to consider the issue of legal entitlement to natural gas stored in coal.¹ In considering this entitlement, the Board has been asked to determine the extent of its jurisdiction, the applicable standard of proof to be applied, and whether that standard has been satisfied.
2. The coal owners wish to dictate the terms of NGC (natural gas in coal) development on freehold lands. They wish to profit from such development without ever demonstrating a compelling or even a credible claim to ownership of the resource. Having obtained a veto on such development under Bulletin 2006-19, the coal owners now seek to maximize their bargaining position by maintaining the status quo as long as possible² and avoiding a potentially adverse adjudication of their ownership claims.
3. In EnCana's case, the benefits of the status quo go beyond an ever improving bargaining position, and include the opportunity to eventually take back its natural gas leases due to lack of development, or due to offset obligations that might accrue during the currency of Bulletin 2006-19. Given the potential volume of accrued offsets, it may be impossible for lessees to satisfy their offset obligations when Bulletin 2006-19 is rescinded.³ This is of increasing relevance the longer Bulletin 2006-19 remains in effect.
4. With Bulletin 2006-19, the coal owners have effectively obtained all the benefits of an injunction without meeting the stringent legal test to obtain one in the Court of Queen's Bench, and without any exposure to liability for the damages caused to the gas producers

¹ In this argument, Devon will use the same terminology, descriptions and defined terms as set out in its pre-hearing Submissions (Exhibit 05-066-08-25) and Reply Submissions, (Exhibit 05-06-2006-09-29) unless otherwise stated. Devon will use the term natural gas stored in coal, abbreviated to "NGC" to refer to the substance at issue in this proceeding, which substance is often also referred to as "coalbed methane" or "CBM".

² Hearing transcript, Day 7 at p. 1018, l. 6 - p. 1021, l. 18.

³ Hearing transcript, Day 7 at p. 1012, l. 8 - p. 1013, l. 14.

as a result.⁴ The continuation of this regime is manifestly unfair to natural gas rights holders, and is not in keeping with the orderly and efficient development of the resources.

5. Unlike the coal owners, Devon wishes to develop the NGC resource on freehold lands, and has expended considerable sums⁵ to do so. It would be wrong at law, as well as highly inequitable, for Devon to have its investment stranded and be forced to bring legal action against the coal owners simply because the coal owners decided to object to the licenses and holdings at issue.
6. Devon submits that the Board should be guided in this proceeding by the facts and law relevant to ownership of NGC on split title lands, and by the stated purposes of the O&GCA⁶, specifically "the economic, orderly and efficient development in the public interest of the oil and gas resources of Alberta."⁷ These considerations require the Board to confirm the licences and holdings at issue and to rescind Bulletin 2006-19.

II. JURISDICTION

7. EnCana alone challenges the jurisdiction of the Board to make any ruling in this proceeding, arguing that the jurisdiction of the Board is ousted by the presence of a "*bona fide* dispute". Devon submits that adopting such a standard would severely and negatively impact the economic, orderly and efficient development of the NGC resource on freehold lands.⁸ For the reasons suggested in the Part 2 Reply Submission of Devon,⁹ and those expressed herein, EnCana's position should be rejected as being unsupported in law and unworkable in practice.

⁴ As a condition of obtaining interim injunctive relief, a plaintiff must give an undertaking to pay the defendant damages caused by the injunction, should the plaintiff fail in the ultimate result: Sharpe, *Injunctions and Specific Performance in Canada*, (Canada Law Book Inc., Aurora, 1992-), at p. 2 - 35.

⁵ Hearing Transcript, Day 1, at p. 0047, ll. 11-19.

⁶ Oil and Gas Conservation Act, R.S.A. 2000, c.0-6.

⁷ Ibid, at s. 4(c).

⁸ EnCana even seems to agree: Hearing transcript, Day 7, at p. 1084, l. 21 - p. 1086, l. 24.

⁹ Exhibit 05-068-2006-09-29 at paras 11 - 16.

(a) EnCana is lacking *bona fides*

8. Notwithstanding the impracticality of EnCana's position on jurisdiction, Devon feels compelled to make submissions regarding EnCana's *bona fides*¹⁰ in this proceeding, because *bona fides* is a vital element of EnCana's argument on jurisdiction, and EnCana believes that the Board must consider such.¹¹ If objections are not *bona fide*, says EnCana, the Board retains jurisdiction to grant the licences and holdings sought.
9. The evidence before the Board shows numerous inconsistencies between the positions now taken by EnCana and those taken by EnCana in its business dealings, in previous proceedings before the Board, and even earlier in this proceeding. The Board must take these inconsistencies into account in assessing the *bona fides* of EnCana.
10. For instance, EnCana's position that the Board should force the parties to "quiet title" is exactly opposite to the position that its corporate predecessor took in seeking leave to appeal a Board decision in *Alberta Energy Co v. Goodwell Petroleum Ltd.*¹² The Board had shut in AEC bitumen wells, requiring that AEC negotiate an agreement with the gas rights holder to produce the gas cap. The court noted in granting AEC's application for leave to appeal that:

AEC bases its application for leave on two grounds. First, it contends that the Board's decision is patently unreasonable because it imposes a condition that AEC cannot fulfill on reasonable commercial terms. AEC argues that by shutting-in the well until an agreement is reached, the Board heavily weighed the stakes in favour of the gas-cap holder, placing AEC in an untenable negotiating position.¹³

EnCana is now asking the Board to follow precisely the same path that its predecessor AEC actively opposed in *Goodwell*.

¹⁰ Bona fide being defined as "1. Made in good faith; and 2. Sincere, genuine", Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed., Thompson West, St. Paul, Minn, 2004) at 186.

¹¹ Hearing transcript, Day 7, at p. 1064, l. 23 - p. 1065, l. 14.

¹² [2002] A.J. No. 1271 (C.A.).

¹³ Ibid, at para 8

11. More telling are the contrary positions on jurisdiction taken by EnCana in this proceeding. In a letter to the Board dated April 28, 2005¹⁴ EnCana urged the Board to determine ownership, stating: "The Board is empowered and obliged to determine entitlement by the *Oil & Gas Conservation Act*." EnCana was urging the Board to hold a full hearing into entitlement¹⁵, which was then in EnCana's business interest.¹⁶
12. EnCana again unequivocally endorsed the view that the Board has jurisdiction to rule on ownership at an oral hearing held on January 31, 2006. That hearing was held in order to determine if the requests by EnCana and CDP for a review hearing should be granted, rather than having the licenses stand. In submissions before this Board at that oral hearing, EnCana's counsel responded to a question from Board counsel as to whether the Board had the jurisdiction to determine who owns the NGC:

Yes, and that is said with reference to Section 16 of the *Oil and Gas Conversation Act*, ... the Court of Appeal, Mr. Larder, recognized that it was incumbent upon the Board and they had to determine the relative ownership of the parties.¹⁷

EnCana's counsel went on to state:

...the fundamental premise or the requirement from the Board is Section 16. Section 16 says determine entitlement. You can't determine entitlement unless you determine ownership. It may not bind everybody. It may not have great precedential effect to non-parties, but it is necessary, and it is required.¹⁸

13. EnCana's current position on jurisdiction¹⁹, despite Mr. Welsh's attempt to suggest otherwise, is in stark contrast to the position previously taken by EnCana before this

¹⁴ Exhibit 07-004-2005-04-28, at p. 1.

¹⁵ Ibid, at p. 6.

¹⁶ Hearing transcript, Day 7, at pp. 1058, l. 1 - p. 1060, l. 20.

¹⁷ January 31, 2006 Hearing transcript, at p. 46, ll. 3 - 13.

¹⁸ Ibid, at p. 47, ll. 20-25.

¹⁹ See EnCana's pre-hearing Submission as revised (Exhibit 07-024-2006-09-15) at para 5: "5. As there is a *bona fide* dispute on entitlement of the applicant CNG owners to CBM, the Board cannot grant the approvals sought as it has no jurisdiction to decide ownership."

Board. When it was seeking to obtain a suspension and review of the contested licences and holdings, EnCana told the Board that it could, and indeed must, determine ownership. Now, when EnCana's interests are served by postponing a potentially adverse decision, EnCana asserts that the Board lacks jurisdiction to rule on regulatory entitlement under section 16 of the O&GCA due to a dispute on ownership.

14. Perhaps most important is that even EnCana's position on NGC ownership apparently depends on the immediate financial benefit to be gained. EnCana takes a different position concerning the NGC ownership rights depending on whether or not it owns the coal. Where EnCana owns the coal, it takes the position that NGC is coal. Where the Crown or CDP is the coal owner and EnCana owns the natural gas rights, EnCana takes the position that NGC is natural gas.²⁰ How can EnCana be said to be acting *bona fide* in these circumstances?
15. Beyond its own assertions, there is no evidence whatsoever supporting EnCana's claim of *bona fides* in this proceeding. There is however, ample evidence that EnCana will take whatever position serves its immediate interests. Devon therefore urges the Board, to the extent that it is relevant, to find that EnCana lacks *bona fides* in objecting to the licences and holdings at issue in this proceeding.

(b) The Board has jurisdiction to decide entitlement

16. Apart from the issue of *bona fides*, it appears that EnCana believes that in cases where entitlement to a well licence is disputed, the Board is limited to the exercise of an administrative stamping function once the courts have determined that entitlement. This view was rejected by Professor Lucas when giving evidence on EnCana's behalf²¹ and is clearly not in keeping with either relevant legislation or case law. For the reasons given below, Devon submits that the legal jurisdiction of the Board to decide entitlement in the proceeding is not just clear, but beyond doubt.

²⁰ Hearing transcript, Day 7 at p. 1021, l. 19 - p. 1023, l. 2; see also Day 8, p. 1180, l. 16-p. 1183, l. 3; and Day 8, p. 1190, l. 14-p.1193, l. 24 concerning EnCana treating pre-2003 natural gas leases on Crown lands as conveying NGC rights.

²¹ Hearing Transcript, Day 9, at p. 1368, ll. 7-24.

(i) Legislation

17. All parties seem to agree that the Board's powers are based in its enabling legislation. The key statutory provision in this proceeding is Section 16 of the O&GCA which states:

16(1) No person shall apply for or hold a license for a well

(a) for the recovery of oil, gas or crude bitumen,
or

(b) for any other authorized purpose.

Unless that person is a working interest participant and is entitled to the right to produce the oil, gas or crude bitumen from the well or to the right to drill or operate the well for the other authorized purpose, as the case maybe.

(2) If, after 30 days from the mailing of a notice by the Board to a licensee at the licensee's last known address, the licensee fails to prove entitlement under subsection (1) to the satisfaction of the Board, the Board may cancel the licence or suspend the licence on any terms and conditions that it may specify. (emphasis added)

18. This provision gives explicit authority to the Board to grant gas well licenses to a party "entitled to produce" that gas, and to determine entitlement to its "satisfaction" in each case. No restrictions on this jurisdiction, whether as to questions of ownership or otherwise, are expressed. As such, the authority of the Board to rule on entitlement in this proceeding is plain on the face of the statute, and no further inquiry into jurisdiction should be necessary.
19. To the extent that the Board's express jurisdiction under section 16 of the O&GCA may somehow be considered ambiguous or unclear, other statutory provisions specifically grant the Board jurisdiction to rule on entitlement in this proceeding:

- Section 16 of the *Energy Resources Conservation Act*²² (the "ERCA") provides the Board with residual jurisdiction to take all steps necessary to fulfill its functions (such as issuing well licences), stating:

The Board, in the performance of the duties and functions imposed on it by the Act and by any other Act, may do all things that are necessary for or incidental to the performance of any of those duties or functions.

- Section 94 of the O&GCA is of similar effect:

The Board, has the exclusive jurisdiction to examine, inquire into, hear and determine all matters and questions arising under this Act.

20. The coal owners seem to agree that a consideration of ownership of NGC is "necessary for or incidental to" (as per ERCA, section 16), and a "matter or question arising under" (as per O&GCA, section 94) section 16 of the O&GCA. Indeed, this is the very foundation of their objections to the well licences and holdings at issue²³. Jurisdiction must therefore rest with the Board.
21. Moreover, jurisdiction to decide entitlement in this proceeding must by necessity accompany the licence granting authority of the Board. The Supreme Court of Canada recently endorsed this concept of "jurisdiction by necessary implication," and stated the relevant rule as follows:

When legislation attempts to create a comprehensive regulatory framework, the tribunal must have the powers which by practical necessity and necessary implication flow from the regulatory authority explicitly conferred upon it.²⁴

²² R.S.A. 2000, c.E-10.

²³ Hearing transcript, Day 9, at p. 1343, l. 21, p. 1344, l. 5. Professor Lucas calls ownership the "critical factor" in making a decision on the question of entitlement in this proceeding.

²⁴ *Atco Gas & Pipeline Ltd. v Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board)*, [2006] SCJ No. 4 (S.C.C.), at para 51 (quoting *Re: Dow Chemical Canada Inc. and Union Gas Ltd.* (1982), 141 D.L.R. (3d) 641 (H.C.J.)).

22. If the Board were to have authority to grant well licences only when entitlement is not disputed, the Board would in cases of dispute be powerless to fulfill its statutory purpose under section 4(c) of the O&GCA "to provide for the economic, orderly and efficient development in the public interest of the oil and gas resources of Alberta."²⁵ Further, the authority provided in O&GCA section 16(2) to determine entitlement to "the satisfaction of the Board," would be without meaning²⁶.
23. Taken together, the relevant statutory provisions leave no doubt of the Board's power, and indeed obligation, to determine entitlement to the licences and the holdings sought in this proceeding.

(ii) Cases

24. The Board's power to decide "entitlement" in all contexts is also clear in case law. There are a number of cases in which Alberta courts have noted that the Board's regulatory jurisdiction continues in the face of legal disputes, whether as to ownership or otherwise. For example, Fruman J. (as she then was) accepted that the Board had such jurisdiction despite an ownership dispute in *Anderson v. Amoco Canada Oil & Gas*²⁷, stating:

I accept that for regulatory purposes, solution gas belongs to the petroleum owner., ...(emphasis added)

The regulators' view does not determine the legal ownership of solution gas. If the regulators have misconstrued the law, their practices will have to change, however cumbersome that process might be. The courts' function is not to preserve legally incorrect administrative positions., ...

25. Also of relevance on this point is *Alberta Energy Co. v. Goodwell Petroleum Corp.*²⁸
The Board had shut in four AEC bitumen wells that were producing initial gas cap gas

²⁵ O&GCA, s. 4(c).

²⁶ Pierre-Andre Cote, *The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada*, (3d ed., Carswell, Scarborough, 2000) at p. 275: "... an interpretation [of a statute] which adds to the terms of its provisions or deprives them of meaning is not recommended."

²⁷ [1994] A.J. No. 805, (Q.B.) (at paras 146-7).

along with bitumen, on the basis that AEC (EnCana's predecessor) was not entitled to produce the gas cap under its bitumen leases.²⁹ The Court of Appeal reversed the Board decision, holding that the bitumen leases provided AEC with the requisite entitlement to produce the gas cap. Though not strictly an ownership dispute, the case concerned property rights, and the jurisdiction of the Board to make a decision on entitlement by reviewing and interpreting the leases was never questioned.

(c) The Board is capable of exercising this jurisdiction

26. The Board has broad expertise and is fully capable of properly considering any issues, legal or technical, that may be involved in the exercise of its mandate to determine entitlement. In the context of deciding regulatory entitlement the Board can and should inquire into ownership, to the extent it may consider such inquiry to be reasonably necessary and justified by the circumstances.
27. The proper approach was succinctly explained in the testimony of Dean David Percy. Dean Percy noted that where entitlement to produce the resource is at issue, "the Board has to look at sufficient information to prove entitlement to the resource to the satisfaction of the Board",³⁰ with the Board having discretion as to how far to inquire.³¹ While it may well be correct to suggest, as did Professor Lucas, that due to the high order position of property rights in the "legal firmament", the Board should undertake a relatively rigorous inquiry³², this does not in any way restrict the Board's authority to rule on entitlement.

²⁸ (2003), 22 Alta. L.R. (4th) (C.A.).

²⁹ Ibid, at paras. 11-12, 16, 17, 72.

³⁰ Hearing transcript, Day 5 at p. 0720, ll. 7 - 15.

³¹ Hearing transcript, Day 5, at p. 0721, ll. 3 - 12; see also p. 0717, l. 21 - p. 0718, l. 4.

³² Hearing transcript, Day 9, at p. 1344, l.6 - p. 1345, l. 12; and at p. 1374, l. 6 - p. 1377, l. 13.

III. STANDARD OF PROOF

(a) **A balance of probabilities is the correct standard**

28. CDP accepts the Board's legal jurisdiction³³, but attempts to invoke a particularly onerous standard of proof which would effectively remove the Board's ability to determine entitlement in this proceeding. CDP argues that under section 16 of the O&GCA, entitlement must be proven as a certainty before well licences are granted. Without a final court judgment on the specific ownership in dispute, CDP suggests the requisite level of certainty cannot exist. For the reasons expressed below and in Devon's Reply Submission,³⁴ this argument is without merit.
29. It is well established that in tribunal proceedings, the standard of proof is a balance of probabilities.³⁵ CDP has not yet provided any relevant authority suggesting that in this case the Board is instead required to satisfy itself to a standard of certainty. Dean Percy specifically stated in cross examination that he is aware of no such authority,³⁶ and the Alberta Court of Appeal has specifically rejected a "high degree of certainty" as the appropriate standard of proof, specifically endorsing the "balance of probabilities" as the standard of proof in Board proceedings on at least two separate occasions.
30. In *Mesa Operating Ltd. v. Amoco Canada Resources Ltd.*,³⁷ the issue concerned Amoco's decision to conduct an areal based pooling rather than pooling on a reserves basis. The result of an areal based pooling halved the royalty payable to Mesa. In order to assess damages, the Court of Appeal considered how the Board would have dealt with the pooling issue. The court, at paragraph 30, rejected the view that such a decision required certainty, instead determining the dispute on a balance of probabilities:

Does the Board decide the question on the balance of probabilities? It is said, on the contrary, that it requires the evidence establishing the boundaries of the reservoir to meet a more stringent test. Mr O'Brien suggested the burden was "a high

³³ CDP pre-hearing Submission, Exhibit 03-036-2006-09-15, at para 18; Hearing transcript, Day 7, at p. 1001, l. 17 - p. 1002, l. 23.

³⁴ Exhibit 05-06-2006-09-29, at paras. 17-24.

³⁵ Sara Blake, *Administrative Law in Canada*, (4th ed., Lexis Nexis Canada, Markham, 2006) at 69.

³⁶ Hearing transcript, Day 5, p. 0718, l. 21 - p. 0719, l. 2.

³⁷ [1994] A.J. No. 201 (C.A.).

degree of certainty." I have read several Board decisions. . . . On my reading of the decisions, the Board examiners give relief only when persuaded about the facts of the matter, But I do not agree that the Board denies relief unless the matter is entirely free from doubt. I suspect some degree of doubt is inevitably present in these assessments. I therefore conclude that the burden of proof required by the Board is the balance of probabilities . . . (emphasis added)

31. Two years later in *Gannon Bros. Energy Ltd. v. Alberta Energy & Utilities Board*³⁸, the Alberta Court of Appeal reiterated its endorsement of the standard of proof on a balance of probabilities in proceedings before this Board.
32. The underlying rationale for CDP advocating a standard of certainty seems to be that it will suffer irreparable harm if the Board were to err at law in deciding entitlement.³⁹ However, in such case CDP would still be able to seek a variety of remedies in the Court of Queen's Bench, including interim injunctive relief.⁴⁰ By definition, the availability of these remedies shows that any harm that may be suffered by CDP as a result of a ruling in this proceeding is not irreparable.
33. CDP may suggest that Professor Lucas has endorsed the view that a standard of proof requiring certainty should be utilized by the Board in this proceeding. Though Professor Lucas spoke of "a high degree of certainty,"⁴¹ in discussing how the Board should approach entitlement, it is clear in context⁴² that he was referring not to a unique standard of proof to be applied by regulators when dealing with property rights, but to the degree of rigour that the Board should apply in undertaking an inquiry into entitlement where ownership is disputed.
34. Had the Legislature wished to depart from the well established civil standard of proof of a balance of probabilities, it would have specifically expressed this intention. It did not

³⁸ (1996), 178 A.R. 302 (C.A.) at paras. 5-6.

³⁹ CDP pre-hearing Submission, (Exhibit 03-03602006-09-15), at para 30.

⁴⁰ The remedies that could be pursued by CDP at the Court of Queen's Bench include damages, injunctive relief and interim injunctive relief. One usual requirement for interim injunctive relief is the likelihood of irreparable harm if an injunction were not to be granted: Sharpe, *Injunctions and Specific Performance* (Canada Law Book Inc., Aurora, 1992-), at p. 2-26.

⁴¹ Hearing transcript, Day 9, at p. 1376, ll. 3-8.

⁴² See Hearing transcript, Day 9, at p. 1344, l. 6 - p. 1345, l. 12; p. 1374, l. 6 - p. 1376, l. 13.

do so. In the absence of such a legislated direction, the Board is required to act in accordance with the standard that meets the reasonable commercial expectations of the parties before it – a balance of probabilities.

IV. ESTABLISHING ENTITLEMENT

(a) **Construction of the relevant leases turns on the vernacular meaning of "coal"**

35. It is common ground amongst the parties that there is no deficiency in the subject applications or in the state of the relevant leasing documents. The original applications were granted by the Board on the strength of the documents first submitted and the quality of the applications, as opposed to their subject matter, has not been challenged. The only issue appears to be with respect to whether or not the gas producers were granted NGC as part of the gas title or whether this substance has been reserved as part of the coal title.
36. While the granting clauses in the P&NG leases held by Devon⁴³ may vary slightly, they are consistent in that each grants an entitlement to all "natural gas", and reserve "coal" without further description or definition. Where the coal owner is not a party to a lease with Devon,⁴⁴ the underlying grant is simply one of "coal".⁴⁵ On this basis Devon submits that the issue of whether NGC was granted should be decided in the same manner and with the same result under each lease.
37. All parties seem to agree that the starting point for determining how to construe the relevant grants and reservations is *Borys v. Canadian Pacific Railway*⁴⁶. That case involved a 1918 transfer from the CPR reserving all "coal, petroleum and valuable stone". *Borys* established that these words were to be interpreted in their vernacular

⁴³ Exhibits 05-066(a - e) - 2006-08-25.

⁴⁴ On the "Section 8 lands", (see Exhibit 05-066a-2008-08-25) mineral title was split by a transaction between Dome and TransAlta in 1982 (see Exhibit 20-024). On the other lands material to the Devon application, Devon understands that the documents splitting title are the leases appended to Devon's Submissions, at Exhibits 05-066(b-e)-2006-08-25.

⁴⁵ Exhibit 20 - 024.

⁴⁶ [1953] A.C. 217(P.C.).

rather than scientific sense, as used by the land owners, business men or engineers of the day.⁴⁷

38. As a starting point, there can be little doubt that "natural gas" and "gas" include NGC. This is consistent with numerous legislative provisions⁴⁸ as well as statements by the Board,⁴⁹ by EnCana⁵⁰ and by others.⁵¹ With this in mind, and based on *Borys*, the issue on which entitlement in this proceeding turns is the vernacular meaning of "coal" in the relevant grants and leases.

(b) The vernacular meaning of coal excludes NGC

39. Devon submits that vernacular meaning may be proven by various types of evidence, all of which must be weighed according to its probative value. Evidence of how words were used by courts and legislators is potentially relevant, as are dictionary definitions and industry usage. All may be indicative of how landowners, business people and engineers would have understood words in a mineral lease.

(i) Cases

40. Some guidance on the vernacular meaning of "coal" can be gained from Canadian case law. The Privy Council in *Borys* held that a reservation of "coal, petroleum and valuable stone"⁵² excluded hydrocarbons that were in a gaseous phase *in situ*. In *Anderson v. Amoco Canada Oil & Gas*,⁵³ the Supreme Court of Canada held that the owner of all hydrocarbons "except coal and petroleum" owned all hydrocarbons in a gas phase at initial pool conditions⁵⁴.
41. It can be safely taken from *Borys* and *Anderson* that in Canada, reservation of "coal" does not include any hydrocarbons in a gaseous phase at initial reservoir conditions. As set

⁴⁷ Ibid, at 227.

⁴⁸ See Devon Submissions (Exhibit 05-066-2006-08-25), paras. 19-30.

⁴⁹ AEUB Informational Letter IL 91-11, stating "The ERCB and Energy consider coalbed methane to be a form of natural gas" (p.1).

⁵⁰ For example, Exhibits 20-059 (Feb 5, 2002 and July 2, 2002 letters, at p. 1) and 20-058 at p. 2, 3 and 4.

⁵¹ For example, see Exhibit 20-053, CAPP Position Paper: "Natural Gas from Coal in Alberta", at p. 2.

⁵² For the wording of the reservation, see (1951), 2 W.W.R. (N.S.) 145 (Alta. S.C.), at 147.

⁵³ [2004] S.C.C. 49.

⁵⁴ Ibid, at paras 10, 42.

out later in this Argument, NGC is in a gaseous phase *in situ*, such that it cannot be considered to be "coal". However, regardless of the phase of NGC at initial reservoir conditions, Devon submits that the evidence is clear that coal and NGC are understood in the vernacular as separate and distinct substances.

42. American case law is highly persuasive in this respect. *Amoco Petroleum Company v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe et al*⁵⁵ is unquestionably the leading case considering the vernacular meaning of "coal".

43. Dean Percy testified as to the significance of the *Southern Ute* case. He provided a number of cogent reasons why the result in *Southern Ute* likely reflects Canadian law, and why the same result would likely follow in Canada if the present ownership dispute were to be litigated⁵⁶:

- *Southern Ute* dealt with a simple reservation of coal similar to the reservation at issue in this proceeding;
- in construing the meaning of the reservation of coal, the United States Supreme Court followed an interpretive approach similar to that taken in the governing Canadian cases of *Borys* and *Anderson*;
- *Southern Ute* involved expert scientific evidence similar to that presented in this proceeding, which evidence was described very simply and summarized by the court; and
- it was a strong decision of the court, in that it was decided by a 7-1 majority.

44. After careful consideration, the seven judge majority in *Southern Ute* concluded that the term "coal" did not include NGC, stating:

...the common understanding of coal in 1909 and 1910 would not have encompassed CBM gas, both because it is a gas rather than a solid mineral and because it was understood as a distinct substance

⁵⁵ 526 U.S. 865 (1999).

that escaped from coal as the coal was mined, rather than as part of the coal itself.⁵⁷

Given that *Southern Ute* is a decision of the United States Supreme Court, it is submitted that the Board should give it considerable weight, reaching a conflicting result only for compelling reasons supported by cogent and convincing evidence.

45. The coal owners have not put forth any explanation nor have they tendered any evidence as to why the vernacular meaning of "coal" in the United States in the early 20th century was different than that in Western Canada at that same time, or today, or at any time in between. Devon submits that in these circumstances, *Southern Ute* should be followed and the licences and holdings at issue affirmed.

(ii) Legislation

46. Legislators in Canada and elsewhere are also of the view that NGC is not within the vernacular meaning of the term "coal". Alberta and British Columbia both passed laws in 2003 based on the principle that NGC comes within the meaning of the term "natural gas" but not within the meaning of the term "coal"⁵⁸.
47. The *Coal Conservation Act*⁵⁹ also suggests that the vernacular meaning of "coal" is restricted to a solid substances:

"coal", in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes manufactured chars, cokes, and any manufactured solid coal product used or useful as a reductant or energy source or for conversion into a reductant or energy source." (emphasis added)

48. Looking beyond Canada, legislators in Australia and the United Kingdom have also tended to define NGC as a substance separate and distinct from coal⁶⁰.

⁵⁶ Hearing transcript, Day 5, at p. 677, l. 8 - p.678, l. 14.

⁵⁷ See Note 55, at pp. 874-75.

⁵⁸ Percy report, Attachment 'A' to Exhibit 18-002-2006-09-29, at pp. 11 - 12: *Mines and Minerals Act, s.64(1); Coalbed Gas Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 18, s. 1, (re "coal", "coalbed gas")*, s. 4.

⁵⁹ R.S.A. 2000, c. C-17, s. 1.

⁶⁰ Percy report, Attachment 'A' to Exhibit 18-002-2006-09-29, at pp. 12 - 13, and materials cited therein.

49. There is however one foreign jurisdiction where coal owners have been granted ownership of NGC by legislation. In the Australian state of Victoria, the governing legislation refers to "hydrocarbons within a deposit of coal or oil shale". It does not define NGC as a component or part of coal⁶¹, and therefore does not provide any support for the argument that the vernacular meaning of coal includes NGC.

(iii) Dictionaries

50. The court in *Southern Ute* cited numerous late 19th and early 20th century dictionary definitions of coal in the course of discerning vernacular meaning. All these definitions referred to coal as a "solid" of dark color, and without any reference to its chemical composition or constituents.⁶² The court concluded that the vernacular meaning of coal is "the solid rock substance that was the country's primary energy source."⁶³

51. More current dictionary definitions of coal support this conclusion. The Merriam - Webster's Collegiate dictionary defines "coal", *inter alia*, as "a black or brownish black solid combustible substance",⁶⁴ while the Canadian Oxford paperback dictionary⁶⁵ defines coal as a "hard black or blackish rock "

52. Dictionary definitions of "fire-damp" (a synonym of NGC) tend to define it in such a way as to infer that it is a distinct substance from coal. In *Southern Ute*, the court noted that dictionaries in the late 19th and early 20th century defined it as a gas "contained in" or "given off by" coal but not as coal itself, indicating that it was viewed as a distinct substance.⁶⁶

53. More recent dictionary definitions of "fire damp" are consistent with those referenced in *Southern Ute*. As an example, the 1970 re-issue of the Oxford English Dictionary defines "fire-damp" as:

⁶¹ *Petroleum Act*, Victoria, 1998, s. 6(2).

⁶² Note 55, at p. 874.

⁶³ *Ibid*, at p. 874.

⁶⁴ 10th ed. (at p. 219)

⁶⁵ Exhibit 20-060.

⁶⁶ Note 55, at p. 874.

a miner's term for carburetted hydrogen or marsh-gas which is given off by coal,⁶⁷ (emphasis added)

54. A further example is found in the 1983 Gage Canadian Dictionary⁶⁸ which defines "fire-damp" not as part of coal, but as:

a mixture of gases, consisting mainly of methane, that forms in coal mines

55. Devon is not aware of any dictionary or other non-scientific definitions of coal or NGC that suggest NGC is a component of coal, as opposed to a distinct substance given off by the coal. Just as coal is considered a solid, it would seem clear that NGC continues to be considered to be a substance "contained in" or "given off" by coal, and separate and distinct from the coal itself.

(iv) Industry meaning

56. Industry vernacular usage will usually be of importance in interpreting a lease term. Here, there is evidence strongly suggesting the industry understanding of coal as a solid substance separate and distinct from the gas stored within the coal structure. In contrast, there is no such evidence of any landowner, business person or engineer considering NGC as a constituent of coal.
57. Proof of the industry view of coal and NGC as separate substances is provided by PanCanadian's 1993 lease form.⁶⁹ This reflects one of the first attempts by industry to provide explicitly for NGC in its leases.⁷⁰ At that time, PanCanadian sought to exclude NGC from the grant and specifically distinguished it from coal when doing so. The definition of "leased substances" in that lease contains the exclusionary phrase: "except coal and petroleum and except natural gas derived from or associated with coal deposits".⁷¹

⁶⁷ The Oxford English Dictionary (1970 re-issue), Vol. IV at p. 243.

⁶⁸ Gage Canadian Dictionary, (Gage Educational Publishing, 1983) at p. 445.

⁶⁹ Exhibit 20-049.

⁷⁰ Hearing transcript, Day 7, at p. 1049, l. 10 - p. 1052, l. 4.

⁷¹ Exhibit 20-049 - see definition of "leased substances".

58. Further, EnCana's conduct indicates an acknowledgement that that a lease of natural gas without coal includes NGC. Prior to the 2003 revisions to the *Mines and Mineral Act* which clarified NGC ownership on Crown lands⁷², EnCana drilled a number of NGC wells on Crown lands prior to 2003 on the strength of its natural gas leases⁷³. EnCana also attempted in 2001 and 2002 to negotiate a farmout or joint venture with Centrica to develop NGC on Crown lands, relying on Centrica's natural gas leases to provide the required entitlement.⁷⁴ EnCana obviously considered NGC as "natural gas" under natural gas leases.
59. The coal owners have even acknowledged that the current common understanding of the terms "coal" would be as a solid rock substance, similar to the view expressed in *Southern Ute*.⁷⁵ EnCana further confirmed that it considered NGC to be a "natural gas" in common vernacular, without any mention of that substance allegedly being a constituent of coal.⁷⁶
60. The industry specific experts also concurred that coal is a solid. Although he believed that using the word solid to describe coal is not appropriate in the scientific sense, Dr. Jeffrey Levine acknowledged in his report⁷⁷, that use of the term solid to describe coal is accurate in the vernacular sense. Mr. Matthew Mavor also made this point in his report.⁷⁸

(c) The evidence before the Board is sufficient to establish vernacular meaning

61. The coal owners, having requested this hearing before the Board, have offered little or no evidence to the Board to indicate that the applicable vernacular meaning of coal includes NGC. Yet, Devon expects that they will try to turn this lack of evidence to their advantage and urge the Board to accept the contention of Professor Lucas⁷⁹ that the evidence of vernacular is insufficient to allow a ruling on entitlement. To accept

⁷² R.S.A. 2000, c. M-17, at section 67(1) (which was enacted in S.A. 2003 c.18, at s. 15)

⁷³ Hearing transcript, Day 8, at p. 1180, l. 16 - p. 1183, l. 3.

⁷⁴ Hearing transcript, Day 8, at p. 1190, l. 14 - p. 1193, l. 24.

⁷⁵ Hearing transcript, Day 7, at p. 1045, l. 13 - p. 1046, l. 3.

⁷⁶ Hearing transcript, Day 7, at p. 1197, ll. 8 - 12.

⁷⁷ Exhibit 19-002-2006-09-15, at p. 7, ll. 16-19

⁷⁸ Mavor report, attachment "A" to the Joint Submission of ConocoPhillips et al, Exhibit 18-001-2006-08-25, at p. 1: "Coal is a rock composed of solid carbonaceous material, ..."

⁷⁹ Hearing transcript, Day 9, at p. 1341, ll. 13 - p. 1342, l. 6.

Professor Lucas' view would be equivalent to imposing by other means the extraordinary standard of proof sought by CDP, and which has been conclusively rejected by the courts.

62. Devon submits that the evidence before the Board is more than sufficient. The vernacular meanings of coal throughout the 20th century has been clearly proven. The word "coal" has at all relevant times been understood as a solid brownish-black rock. NGC has at all material times been understood as a separate and distinct mineral. These conclusions are both supported by multiple evidentiary sources, and even by the words and the conduct of the coal owners themselves.
63. The suggestion that more evidence is required also seems to ignore the practice of the courts in determining vernacular meaning. In *Borys* and *Southern Ute*, the courts did not require expert evidence from lexicographers, linguists, etymologists or historians when assessing vernacular. Such evidence is not required by the Board either. The available evidence in the form of case law, legislation, dictionaries and industry usage is more than sufficient to prove, on a balance of probabilities, the vernacular meaning of the terms at issue.

(d) The scientific evidence shows that NGC is a distinct, gaseous substance at initial reservoir conditions

64. If it is held that NGC belongs to the natural gas rights holders only if it is gaseous *in situ*, then the Board can be expected to have regard for the scientific evidence of Mr. Matthew Mavor and Dr. Jeffrey Levine. Devon adopts the submissions made in respect of that scientific evidence in the Joint Argument of the Natural Gas Rights Holders, filed concurrently with this Argument (the "Joint Argument").
65. The key facts established by the scientific evidence are described in the Joint Argument. Specifically, Devon submits that the following significant facts were clearly established⁸⁰;
- coal is a rock and therefore a solid substance;

⁸⁰ Joint Argument of the Natural Gas Rights Holders, at p. 2.

- gas stored in coal is gaseous at the in situ temperature and pressure conditions of Alberta's coal seams; and
- coal is a container for natural gas. The two substances are easily separated.

66. To the extent that the vernacular distinction between coal and NGC depends on the phase in which NGC exists *in situ*,⁸¹ the scientific evidence provides a clear result. NGC would fall clearly within the meaning of "natural gas" and not of "coal", since it exists in a gaseous phase at all times. For the same reason, and according to Borys and Anderson, NGC would fall outside the vernacular meaning of "coal".⁸²

(e) Mineral grants are of substances, not strata

67. The coal owners cite *Little v. Western Transfer and Storage Limited*,⁸³ and a line of cases relied upon therein for the proposition that a reservation of coal gives ownership of the entire strata where the coal is located, including all other substances and minerals that may exist within that strata. This proposition is not correct in law.

68. The flaws in this were addressed by Dean Percy in his report⁸⁴ and during his testimony at the hearing⁸⁵. The reasons provided by Dean Percy as to why the ownership by strata concept suggested in *Little* is not applicable in the present case are:

- (a) The line of cases cited by the Alberta Court of Appeal in *Little* as supporting this conclusion do not, on close examination, provide that support. The genesis of this line of cases is in *Bowser v. MacLean*⁸⁶. The idea that the coal owner owns the entire strata in which the coal is found is not drawn from the reasons issued by the court in *Bowser* (which deals with "outstroke" - the right to use tunnels under one

⁸¹ This situation would then be similar to that in *Borys*, where the vernacular distinction between "petroleum" and other hydrocarbons depended upon whether or not the hydrocarbon was in a liquid phase, *in situ*.

⁸² Professor Lucas conceded that this conclusion would follow if NGC, as it exists *in situ*, is in a gaseous state (Hearing transcript, Day 9, at p. 1388, l. 4 - p. 1389, l. 5).

⁸³ [1922] 3 W.W.R. 356 (Alta. S.C.A.D.)

⁸⁴ Attachment "A" to Exhibit 18-03-2006-09-29, at pp. 14 - 16.

⁸⁵ Hearing transcript, Day 5, at p. 0673, l. 25 - p. 0677, l. 7.

⁸⁶ (1860), 45 E.R. 682 (Chancery).

parcel to transport coal from under another), but from an editor's note in an unofficial series of law reports;⁸⁷

- (b) The concept of mineral ownership by strata has never been applied to resolve any competing claims to minerals within the same strata, and would lead to absurd results if adopted in those situations. To quote Dean Percy:

The transfer and reservation of coal is subject to the same rules as other minerals. Where one person owns coal rights and another owns the rights to another mineral, I am not aware of any case in which the courts have found, as Professor Lucas asserts, that the person who owns the coal strata owns all the substances (including the other mineral) within those strata. Such a conclusion would lead to absurd results and mean, for example, that where A owns rights to coal and B owns rights to petroleum and natural gas, B would have no claim to any petroleum and natural gas contained in the same strata as A's coal. There is no principle that a right to coal pre-empts the rights to all other minerals.⁸⁸

69. The strata based mineral ownership theory urged by the coal owners is virtually unknown in legal scholarship and jurisprudence. It has entirely "escaped the people who wrote property law textbooks",⁸⁹ and has, as far as Devon can discern, never been cited or relied upon by any Canadian court. Even Professor Lucas admitted in cross-examination that his discussion of the *Little* case does not suggest that a strata based theory of ownership regarding coal has been articulated by Canadian courts.⁹⁰
70. A review of the relevant grants and leases also refutes the suggestion that title was severed based on strata as opposed to substance. Specifically, the reservations of coal

⁸⁷ Hearing transcript, Day 5, at p. 0675, l. 25 - p. 0677, l. 7; Exhibit 20 - 037 (case report with editor's note).

⁸⁸ Percy report Attachment 'A' to Exhibit 18-003-2006-09-29, at p. 16.

⁸⁹ Hearing transcript, Day 5, at p. 0675 ll. 10 - 11: see also p. 0677 ll. 6 - 7.

⁹⁰ Hearing transcript, Day 9, at p. 1347, l. 22 - p. 1348, l. 1.

relied upon by the coal owners are often contained in a definition of "leased substances"⁹¹. Older leases describe various substances, and also use the phrase "leased substances" elsewhere in the document.⁹² All relevant leases and title documents describe the rights of the parties according to the mineral substances granted or reserved. None define these rights according to strata.

71. In summary, strata based mineral ownership is not supported by the line of cases on which it is said to be based, would lead to absurd results if applied to split mineral titles, conflicts directly with the language in the relevant leases and has not been endorsed in any legal texts or any significant body of Canada case law. The Board should reject this novel theory.

V. PROPOSALS BY ENCANA

(a) Vertical pooling is of no assistance

72. EnCana has made several suggestions to the Board about potential measures to alleviate the detrimental impacts on resource development if the Board does not make a decision in respect of NGC entitlement in this proceeding. One suggestion involves vertical pooling of gas wells. However, pooling is designed to deal with allocating production between resource owners – it does not address a dispute over ownership of the resource⁹³. Where two parties claim ownership of the resource in its entirety, no issue of allocating the resource between the parties is in existence. Even if the law were to allow it, vertical pooling has no application.
73. Of equal importance is the testimony of the applicants and the gas producers that intervened in this proceeding to the effect that if the proceeds of production of NGC were paid to the Provincial Treasurer pending resolution of the resource ownership dispute,

⁹¹ See, for example, the PanCanadian lease at Exhibit 20-049.

⁹² See for example, Exhibit 05-066(e)-2006-08-25 (Devon leases splitting title to "petroleum, natural gas" etc. from coal) at clause 11, 3rd line.

⁹³ Bankes, Nigel, "Compulsory Pooling Under the Oil and Gas Conservation Act of Alberta", (1997) 35 Alta. Law Rev. 945 at pp. 950 - 51, 956 - 57.

they would not develop the resource.⁹⁴ Vertical pooling would thus fail to achieve any purpose.

74. Even if there were two natural gas streams to be pooled (i.e., NGC and natural gas from carbonaceous shales or from sands), measurement of the two streams for allocation purposes would involve intractable technical problems that could significantly undercut the value of the resource and make reliable allocation impossible.
75. One measurement option suggested is metering. It is apparent on the evidence that allocation based on metering would be difficult or even impossible⁹⁵ and results in increased well head pressure both of which have a negative impact on the production rates and economics of the wells.⁹⁶ For this reason, metering is undesirable.
76. Presumably due to a recognition of the costs and production implications of metering, EnCana has suggested, as an alternative to metering, the use of control wells to allocate production. Unfortunately, control wells would not materially assist accurate allocation between the two gas streams. This is because, as stated by Dr. Levine, coal is a heterogeneous substance.⁹⁷ This heterogeneity makes control wells very unreliable guides to production from other wells. Control well data, even data obtained from wells in close proximity, cannot be relied upon to accurately allocate production from a given well.⁹⁸
77. Finally, EnCana has suggested the formation of a technical committee to study the issue and suggest a solution, in the interim keeping intact the development moratorium imposed by Bulletin 2006-19. Devon sees no way that a technical committee would materially assist in solving the entitlement issue now before the Board.

⁹⁴ For example, see Hearing Transcript, Day 1, at p. 0074, l. 23 - p. 0075, l. 1 (re Devon) and Day 3, p. 0456, ll. 8-21 (re Quicksilver).

⁹⁵ Hearing transcript, Day 1, at p. 0071, ll. 17-24.

⁹⁶ Hearing transcript, Day 8, at p. 1242, l. 19 - p. 1243, l. 15; Day 3, at p. 0437, l. 16 - p. 0438, l. 5, and p. 505, l. 20 - p. 506, l. 11.

⁹⁷ Levine report, Exhibit 19-002-2006-09-15, at p. 1.

⁹⁸ Hearing transcript, Day 3, at p. 506, ll. 12-19, and p. 438, ll. 6-25.

(b) Reduced spacing is impractical

78. Another EnCana proposal is a reduction of drilling spacing units for NGC wells, from one well per section to one well per quarter section. As has been indicated by several witnesses before the Board, this would result in only minimal reduction to the volume of land sterilized by Bulletin 2006-19.
79. Moreover, such a plan would result in greater potential for inequitable drainage from stranded parcels, and increased offset obligations on these stranded parcels. This would in turn prejudice the ultimate resource owner, the surface freehold owner, or both. It would result in landowners and resource owners being treated differently depending on the source of their ownership and their proximity to non split title or Crown lands.⁹⁹

(c) A "quiet title" policy unfairly empowers the coal owners

80. The clear goal of the coal owners in this proceeding is to convince the Board to refrain from making any decision and to keep Bulletin 2006-19 in place pending a final judicial decision, thus freezing development of the resource unless such development has the consent of the coal owners. The practical effect of the type of ruling sought by the coal owners is obvious, and is similar to the situation reviewed by the Alberta Court of Appeal in *Alberta Energy Co. v. Goodwell Petroleum Corp. Ltd.*¹⁰⁰:

The Board decided that AEC has no right to produce initial gas-cap gas and ordered it to acquire these rights through an agreement with Goodwell. The effect of this ruling is to give the gas lessee a virtual veto over bitumen production, [See Note 31 below] diminishing the value of the oil sands lessee's rights.

81. This "quiet title" approach was rejected in *Goodwell*. The Court of Appeal was clear that a party with a right to produce a resource should not be forced by the regulator to enter into a commercial arrangement with another party claiming an interest in that production,

⁹⁹ Hearing transcript, Day 3, at p. 507, l. 19 - p. 508, l. 3.

¹⁰⁰ [2003] A.J. No. 1207, (C.A.), at para. 80.

and that the regulator must decide the rights of the parties.¹⁰¹ The same principles are applicable in the present case, and should preclude the result sought by the coal owners.

82. Further, the quiet title approach preferred by EnCana and CDP may not provide the certainty claimed. For example, it was apparent during the hearing that Quicksilver tried this approach with EnCana, but has not received the leases from EnCana contemplated under the coal certainty agreement despite 56 requests for such since June, 2004¹⁰². EnCana continues to object to Quicksilver well license applications on the basis that they do not meet the requirements of the coal certainty agreements.¹⁰³
83. A coal certainty agreement may simply lead to disputes over whether a party has complied with the requirements of the coal certainty agreement. Where EnCana does not agree that such requirements have been met it has continued to object to well licenses, just as, at present, it has objected to well license applications because it does not agree with Devon's interpretation of the relevant lease documents. The same course would be open to CDP. Coal certainty agreements may therefore only transfer the genesis of the dispute from the lease document to the coal certainty document.
84. In summary, by advocating a "quiet title" approach, the coal owners seek a result that would allow them to gain a negotiating advantage over the gas producers dictate the commercial terms of NGC development and given these circumstances, the statements by the Alberta Court of Appeal in *Goodwell*, and the apparent lack of success of some parties in attempting to quiet title even when coal certainty agreements exist, it is clear that forcing the parties to settle their dispute is not a fair, appropriate or practical solution.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, at paras 96-99.

¹⁰² Hearing transcript, Day 7, at p. 1140, l. 21 - p. 1141, l. 12.

¹⁰³ Ibid, p. 1141, ll. 16-20.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

85. Devon submits that the following conclusions are supported by the overwhelming preponderance of evidence and accord with established governing law:

- (a) The Board has the jurisdiction and indeed the obligation to determine the entitlement of Devon and the other applicants to the licenses and holdings sought, regardless of the claims by EnCana and CDP to ownership of the NGC Resource;
- (b) The Board must determine such entitlement on a balance of probabilities;
- (c) The vernacular meaning of words used in the relevant grants and leases govern construction of those documents;
- (d) There is sufficient evidence before the Board concerning the vernacular meaning of "coal" and of other key terms as those terms appear in the relevant grants and leases;
- (e) The vernacular meaning of the unqualified term "coal" in the relevant grants and leases does not include NGC, which has always been considered a separate and distinct substance. NGC falls within the meaning of the unqualified term "natural gas", in the relevant grants and leases;
- (f) The rulings of the Board in the proceeding as to the applicable vernacular meanings of "coal", "natural gas" and any other material terms should, in so far as those terms relate to the NGC, be presumptively applied by the Board when considering well licences and holdings applications.


VII. DISPOSITION

86. Based upon the applicable legislation, the supporting technical interpretation and the entitlement documentation supporting Devon's well license application, Devon has satisfied the requirement of section 16 of the O&GCA that it is entitled to produce the gas

that is the subject of its application and the well license and holdings at issue in this proceeding should be confirmed.

87. Further, Bulletin 2006-19 should be rescinded immediately.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED NOVEMBER 15, 2006.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Douglas E. Crowther", written over a horizontal line.

Douglas E. Crowther
Thomas P. O'Leary
Counsel for Devon Canada Corporation